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Statement of the Case and Factual Summary 
On October 25, 2010, Officer Dustin Cook of the Idaho Falls Police Department saw 
Rosemary Dycus enter a Common Cents convenience store. Transcript, Motion to Suppress 
Hearing, January 31, 2011, p. 6. Although initially contradictory, the officer ultimately clarified 
that he did not conduct a formal traffic stop of Ms. Dycus's vehicle, although he had information 
that she was driving without privileges. ld. at p. 6, 7, and 13. He began observing the entrance 
waiting for Ms. Dycus and other officers arTived at the scene. ld. at 7. The officer determined 
that she had entered the restroom, but found that the door was locked by its occupant. !d. at 10. 
After knocking and announcing his presence, Ms. Dycus asked him to "wait a minute" as she 
flushed the toilet. ld. at 11. However, the impatient officer decided to get the restroom key from 
the store clerk and force his way into the restroom. ld. at 12. Inside the restroom, he found Ms. 
Dycus, who was still getting dressed, as well as her jacket on the floor. ld. at 12-13. He 
searched the jacket and found a marijuana pipe. ld. at 13. At no point during these events did 
Officer Cook apply for a warrant. See id. Ms. Dycus was ultimately charged with Paraphanalia, 
as well as Driving Without Privileges (DWP). 
Procedural History 
The Defendant, Rosemary Pearl Dycus, was convicted in the United States District Court 
for the Seventh Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville on 
October 25, 2010. The Defendant initially was charged with violating I.C. 37-2734(A) for 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia-use or Possess with Intent to Use, and Driving Without 
Privileges under I.e. 18-8001. Defendant brought a motion to suppress based on a violation of 
her right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and siezures as well as violation of 
her right of an expectation of privacy in a public restroom. Defendant's motion was heard and 
denied by the Magistrate Court. 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State whereby she would plead guilty to 
Possession of Paraph em alia, and in consideration the state would dismiss the DWP. Pursuant to 
the plea agreement, Defendant preserved her right to appeal the Magistrate Court's denial of her 
suppression motion. 
Defendant was sentenced on August 18, 2011, and was ordered to pay a fine of one 
thousand dollars ($1000) with a sentence of 3 days in the Bonneville County jail with a 
suspended sentence of 362 days. An informal probation tem1 of 2 years was also ordered. 
Standard of Review 
While the reviewing court defers to the factual findings of the trial court unless they are 
clearly erroneous, it does exercise de novo review of whether the constitutional requirements 
were satisfied in light of those facts. State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658 (Ct. App. 1988). 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Seventh 
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville in a criminal case. On 
August 24, 2011, a timely Notice of Appeal was filed from which this appeal follows. 
Issue on Appeal 
Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's appeal of the Magistrate's Court ruling 
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress where a law enforcement officer forced his way into a 
locked public restroom at a Common Cents convenience store where Rosemary Dycus had a 
legitimate expectation 'of privacy and ultimately searched Defendant's person without a warrant? 
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Argument 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT ROSEMARY DYCUS HAD A 
LEGITIMENT EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE COMMON CENTS PUBLIC 
RESTROOM 
Because the officer unreasonably entered a locked public restroom without 
permission or a warrant, the evidence should be suppressed unless Ms. Dycus did not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, as well as the FOUlih Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. These 
protection apply to people, not places. State v. Limberhand, 117 Idaho 456, 459-60 (Ct. App. 
1990); Katz v. Us., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). A warrantless search is presumed to be 
unreasonable. State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (Idaho 1993); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
390 (1978). 
Because Ms. Dycus had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the restroom, the 
evidence found in the jacket that was on the floor of the restroom should be 
suppressed as the fruit of an unconstitutional search and seizure. 
The protections against unreasonable and warrantless searches applies to all areas 111 
which a person manifests a SUbjective expectation of privacy that society would objectively view 
as reasonable. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 749 (Idaho 19880); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, 1. concurring). If a person manifests a subjective expectation of privacy in a public 
restroom, society would objectively recognize it as reasonable. Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460. 
Therefore, the only question remaining is whether Ms. Dycus manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the public restroom. 
To determine if a subjective expectation of privacy has manifested, the court examines 
"the citizen's efforts to protect his own privacy from observation by the general public, taking 
3 
into account norms of social conduct and the nature of the premises." State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 
562, 565 (Ct. App. 1998). For example, a person who knowingly exposes an area to the public 
cannot also manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in that area. State v. Delacerda, 135 
Idaho 903,904 (et. App. 2001); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
A person can manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in a public restroom. 
Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 459. In that case, the fact that the person kept the door closed while 
he was inside the public stall and that all observable indicators (i.e. the position of his feet 
viewable under the stall door) suggested normal use of the stall revealed his subjective 
expectation of privacy. Id. He did this to prevent the public from viewing his activities in the 
stall and "was utilizing the features of the stall to prevent exposure." Id. No actions revealed in 
the record revealed any intent inconsistent with that expectation. Id. Therefore, the cOUli 
concluded, Mr. Limberhand had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the public 
restroom stall. Id. 
The court also noted that the subjective expectation does not hinge on the design of the 
restroom or stall. Id. This is because Article I, Section 17 and the Fourth Amendment protect 
people, not places, from unreasonable intrusions. Id. at 459-60; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. While an 
area may be accessible to the public at other times, it may be put to a private use at any given 
moment, and during the period when it is being used privately, the person using the area may 
reasonably expect freedom from intrusions. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, 1. concurring) 
(discussing the COUli's holding that a public telephone booth constitutes a private area when a 
person enters it to make a call and uses the features of the booth to prevent the public from 
overhearing his conversation). 
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That same rationale applies to public restrooms. Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460. 
Therefore, when a person locks themselves in a public restroom or stall, they are manifesting a 
subjective expectation of privacy. See id.; see also Delacerda, 135 Idaho at 905. In Delacerda, 
the complete absence of any provisions for privacy in the layout of the public restroom (i.e. no 
stalls, dividers, or barriers between the multiple toilets, or most importantly, locks on the door), 
there cannot be a subjective expectation of privacy, 135 Idaho at 905. The "visual openness of 
the restroom interior, and the lack of any lock to exclude others with the restroom was in use" 
meant that any activity undertaken in the restroom was knowingly exposed to the public. ld., 
emphasis added. This is because all activities, even the traditional and proper uses, may be 
observed by any person also using the restroom or who walks into the restroom. ld. Officers 
are allowed to observe what a reasonably respectful person would observe from a legitimate 
vantage point without a warrant. State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313 (et. App. 1993). Therefore, 
there was no unreasonable search in Delacerda. 135 Idaho at 906. However, when the features 
of the facility are employed to prevent others from observing activities in a public restroom (i.e. 
by using a lock on the door), an invasion by officers is unreasonable, beyond the scope of what a 
reasonably respectful person would be able to observe, and thus, violate Article I, Section 17 and 
the Fourth Amendment. Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460-61. 
The fact that Ms. Dycus used the features of the restroom to prevent entry by the public 
by employing the lock, she manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. See Transcript at 10; 
contrast with Deiacera, 135 Idaho 905-06. Furthermore, there was no evidence in the record 
suggesting that it was a multi-toilet restroom without any privacy screens. Contrast with 
Delacera, 135 Idaho 905-06. Rather, all that the officer testified to was that it was a uni-gender 
restroom with a storage closet inside. See Transcript at 14-15. The fact that it was uni-gender 
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suggests that it was a single-person restroom so that a man and a woman would not be subjected 
to sharing the same private space while using the restroom. 
The rest of the officer's observations also support a finding of a subjective expectation of 
privacy. All the officer's observations from his legitimate vantage point outside the door are 
consistent with the proper use of the restroom. See Transcript at 11-12; compare with 
Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 459. When Ms. Dycus entered the restroom, she locked the door. 
Transcript at 10. When someone knocked on the door, she asked them to wait a moment while 
she finished using the restroom and prepared herself to leave. !d. at 11-12. The magistrate found 
that the facts showed no indication of improper use of the facilities. Id. at 22. As it is not clearly 
erroneous, this finding is binding on the reviewing court. See Heinen, 114 Idaho at 658. 
The protections of Article I, Section 17 and the Fourth Amendment also do not hinge on 
the purpose of the invasion. See id. The magistrate held that because the entry was unrelated to 
the criminal act the officer was investigating (DWP), no expectation of privacy could exist. 
Transcript at 22. In fact, she recognized that nothing in the record indicated any improper use of 
the restroom at all. Id. Officers cannot even establish reasonable suspicion based only on their 
speculations of wrongdoing, much less establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a warrant 
or justify a walTantless search. See State v. Deen, 131 Idaho 435, 436 (Idaho 1998). The fact 
that the officer was investigating a DWP is irrelevant, lest the protections of Article I, Section 17 
and the Fourth Amendment become meaningless. Such a perspective would allow an officer to 
invade any area, including the sanctity of the home, without a warrant, so long as they claim to 
be investigating a minor infraction or misdemeanor (i.e. noise disturbance) and then prosecute 
for any crime for which evidence happens to be uncovered during the warrantless search. This 
approach, as taken by the magistrate, does not conform with established search and seizure case 
6 
law. Rather, the only relevant inquiries are: 1) whether the person manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society would objectively recognize as reasonable; and 2) if so, 
whether the presumption of invalidity is overcome by an applicable exception. See Thornpson, 
114 Idaho at 749; see also Curl, 125 Idaho at 225. 
As to the first relevant inquiry, Ms. Dycus did manifest a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society would objectively recognize as reasonable. See Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 
459-60. The officer entered that protected area without a wan'ant. See generally Transcript. He 
looked through the jacket that was in the protected space, which constitutes a search. See 
Limberhand, 117 Idaho at 460 (holding that any invasion of the privacy interest, even if it is only 
visual, constitutes a search for constitutional purposes). Therefore, the search is presumed to be 
unreasonable unless there is an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. Curl, 125 Idaho 
at 225; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390. None of the exceptions apply in this case. Therefore, the 
evidence found during the search must be suppressed. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 
(Idaho 1999); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832,840 (Ct. App. 2008). 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING A REVOCATION OF DEFENDANT'S 
PERMISSION TO USE THE PUBLIC RESTROOM 
The District Court correctly found that when Rosemary Dycus entered into the Common 
Cents restroom, she had a privacy interest upon entering that facility. The District Court erred in 
finding that an agent of Common Cents revoked their permission for her continued use of the 
bathroom when the officer acquired the key from the clerk. The District Court's analysis is 
flawed because it discounts the State's action. The Common Cents clerk did not call the police 
and request they remove Dycus from the restroom. The officer followed Ms. Dycus in the 
building pounded on the door and retrieved the key from the clerk. At Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, the State did not call the clerk as a witness and no other testimony was offered 
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suggesting an agent of the Common Cents revoked Ms. Dycus' permission to use the restroom, 
prior to the officer acquiring the key and entering the restroom. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FINDING OF THE 
PARAPHERNALIA WAS INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
The District Court erred in finding that the discovery of the paraphemalia was inevitable 
and therefore falls under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. To reach such a conclusion, the 
District Court has to ignore an important fact and the two inescapable consequences of that fact. 
The bathroom Ms. Dycus was in was a public restroom. Granted it is possible that Ms. Dycus 
would have left the paraphemalia on her person, but it is also conceivable that she would not 
have and would take other action. The fact that Ms. Dycus had options as to her behavior 
contradicts a foregone conclusion required for inevitable discovery. Unless Ms. Dycus left the 
marijuana pipe in her coat then the state would first have had to find it and second, they would 
then have had to be able to connect the pipe with Ms. Dycus. 
In the event Ms. Dycus abandoned the pipe, then the officer would have had to find it. 
The officer stated he searched Ms. Dycus but does not go into detail of the extent of the search 
he conducted into the restroom. Without testimony to that effect, discovery is not only not 
inevitable, but highly unlikely. Second, even if Ms. Dycus had placed the pipe in plain view, this 
was a public place and state would have faced a large evidentiary hurdle connecting the pipe to 
Ms. Dycus. 
Conclusion 
Because Ms. Dycus manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the public restroom 
and because society would objectively recognize that expectation as reasonable, Ms. Dycus had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the restroom, and the warrantless search of that area is 
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presumed to be unreasonable. No exceptions validate the search and prevent the evidence's 
suppression. Neither revocation of Defendant's permission to use the Common Cents restroom, 
nor inevitable discovery justifies the officer's forced entry into a bathroom being used by Ms. 
Dycus. 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Dycus requests this court to reverse the 
District Court's denial of her motion to suppress, vacate her conviction and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2012. 
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TIMOTHY D. FRENCH 
Deputy Public Defender 
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